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AJPH EDITORIALS
Fighting Independent Risk
Assessment of Talc and Glyphosate:
Whose Beneﬁt Is It Anyway?
See also Rosner et al., p. 969; Michaels, p. 975; Samet, p. 976;
Vineis, p. 978; Rodenberg, p. 980; and Singla et al., p. 982.

The vast majority of Americans
trust that science is an essential
component of modern decisionmaking and should fuel policymaking. Despite vociferous opposition to the scientiﬁc evidence on
the safety of vaccines today, 80% to
90% of US parents vaccinate their
children, and only 13% of Americans said in 2016 that they did not
fully believe vaccines were safe
(am.ajph.link/PEW_Vaccines2019).
It is, therefore, not an issue of
political preference, race, religion,
or any other social divide. Scientiﬁc
evidence is one of the rare issues on
which people may agree even
though they widely differ in their
personal beliefs. But science can
play its role only if it is produced
independently of these other forms
of interest, be they of a ﬁnancial,
career promotion, political, religious, racial/ethnic, or any other
nature. The articles in this issue
illustrating attempts to discredit
independent scientiﬁc assessment
for the sake of corporate interests
made me ask a question I had never
asked myself before: is ﬁghting
independent risk assessment really
in corporations’ interests?

BABY POWDER
Consider how the trade association of cosmetic talcum powder
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manufacturers maneuvered the
Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to authorize the sale of talcum powder containing asbestos. It
was able to impose a test screening
for “nondetected” levels of asbestos,
which would leave up to 1% of
asbestos in the talc, that is 10 times
more asbestos than the 0.1% the
FDA requested. Commercial talcum powder, such as baby powder,
is a mineral product extracted from
rock ore dug from mines, originally
in Italy and later in Vermont. It is a
mix of hydrated magnesium silicate
with other minerals, including
asbestos ﬁbers. A Reuters investigation (am.ajph.link/Reuters_
JandJ2018) revealed that Johnson &
Johnson, the company that produces it, knew for a long time that
its baby powder contained ﬁbers
but disputed scientists’ charges that
it was a health risk for its clients. As
shown by Rosner et al. (p. 969),
scientists had warned that the
quantity of asbestos undetectable
using the manufacturer’s radiographic test amounted to billions of
asbestos ﬁbers per grams of talc.
Asbestos is a known carcinogen.
Now ovarian cancers are being
diagnosed among women who
used Johnson & Johnson’s talc
(“baby powder”), and courts are
ruling in favor of the women.
Was it really in the industry’s
interest to impose its own risk

assessment? Let’s explore
Rodenberg’s (p. 980) idea that
the industry should see independent risk assessment as an
ally rather than a foe because it is
in its interest to avoid natural
and humanitarian catastrophes.
Johnson & Johnson and its advisors underestimated the risk
that independent scientists had
correctly assessed. I have estimated the cost and beneﬁt of this
failure for Johnson & Johnson
assuming a purely capitalistic,
conscienceless, amoral perspective in which the aim of the
company is to maximize its proﬁt,
ignoring the entailed human cost.
The lawsuits against Johnson &
Johnson already cost the company
$4.69 billion, which went to 22
women who blamed their ovarian
cancer on asbestos in the company’s baby powder and other talc
products. Coming next are thousands of other plaintiffs, including
women with ovarian cancer, suing
the company, arguing that the talc
is responsible for their cancer. The
litigation cost can be expected to
grow rapidly in the coming years.
In addition, Johnson & Johnson
invested resources to develop its

insensitive screening test for the
presence of asbestos in the talc. The
company’s stock dropped, wiping
out additional billions in Johnson
& Johnson’s market value. Perhaps
most important for the long-term
proﬁtability and sustainability of
the company, the tragedy has
forever stained the heretofore beneﬁcent public image of the
“family-friendly” company producing “baby shampoo” and
“baby powder,” whose former
owner, Robert Wood Johnson II,
endowed the highly respected and
independent eponymous foundation with more than 10 million
shares of the company’s stock.
Trust is broken and sales may
drop. In terms of proﬁts, grossly,
extrapolating the 2017 revenue
data of Johnson & Johnson
provided by Reuters (am.ajph.
link/Reuters_JandJ2018), if the
company made $420 million per
year of revenue from the baby
powder over 50 years, this amounts
to $21 billion (= 420 · 50), or 5 per
thousand of the overall revenue of
$4 trillion (i.e., declared $80 billion
for 2018 · 50 years) the company
could have made during this period.
There may have been additional
indirect beneﬁts Johnson & Johnson
was reaping from the talcum
powder, but it is difﬁcult to imagine,
even adopting a cynical capitalistic
perspective, that the 50 years of extra
proﬁt Johnson & Johnson made by
refusing to implement a more rigorous puriﬁcation of the talc or
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replacement of the talc by another
substance outweighed the tremendous cost.

BAYER-MONSANTO
GLYPHOSATE
To defend what they perceive as
in their best interests, some corporations not only pressure governmental agencies, they ﬁght
them. Samet (p. 976) describes how
Monsanto has moved extremely
aggressively against the science, the
unpaid expert volunteers, and institutions such as the International
Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC), which tried to share the
result of their independent assessment of glyphosate (Roundup)
as a possible carcinogen. These
actions imperil the existence of
the peer review processes but
maybe the survival of Bayer
(which bought Monsanto) too.
As in the case of Johnson
& Johnson’s talc, the dramatic
consequences of neglecting the
independent risk assessment of

glyphosate are unfolding. As I write,
Bayer lost a third trial against a
French farmer, Paul François, who
suffers from neurologic problems
that the courts have causally linked to
glyphosate, and a California jury
awarded $2.055 billion to a couple
for cancers caused by the weedkiller.
There are 11 200 more plaintiffs
lined up. Bayer’s stocks have lost
40% since 2018 and keep going
down, and the image most people
have of Bayer, as the company that
produces the wonder drug aspirin,
may be forever stained. This may
have been avoided had Monsanto
informedthe public that independent
science established that glyphosate
was “genotoxic” and “probably”
caused cancers in humans.

PUBLIC HEALTH
CONSCIENCE
The independent assessment of
risk associated with industrial
products is, as Vineis (p. 978) reminds us, part of the checks and
balances that are indispensable in a

democratic society. The industry
cannot be expected to impartially
assess the potential toxicity of its
own products. Independent risk
assessment requires speciﬁc procedures and skills for the conclusions arising from reviewing and
summarizing a large body of evidence to be transparent and useful
for policy decisions. IARC
monographs are an ingenious way
to do exactly that. The conclusions
of their unpaid expert volunteers
cannot be replaced by reviews
from scientists paid by the industry.
Independent risk assessment has
a cost. To play their role as independent checks, governmental
and international agencies need
resources. Michaels (p. 975), former
assistant secretary of labor for the
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, stresses that lack of
resources handcuffs many public
health agencies. In the case of the
asbestos-related risk from talc, the
FDA’s lack of money and manpower may explain why it could
not challenge the industry’s obviously inadequate risk assessment
procedures by generating its own,

polarized microscopy asbestos
screening test. The underresourced
Federal Aviation Administration’s
missed assessment of the safety of
the Boeing 737 MAX is another
case in point.
Some corporations do not hesitate to undermine the legitimacy and
credibility of the institutions, such as
the FDA, the surgeon general, the
Environmental Protection Agency,
the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, or the IARC, whose
missions are to produce or summarize the science to protect all of us
from harmful, toxic products, behaviors, or policies. But the cases
of talc and glyphosate speak for
themselves: it was in Johnson &
Johnson’s and Monsanto’s best interest to support and respect the
independent, conscientious scientiﬁc risk assessment. The converse is
not true: the public could not rely on
the corporate industry’s scientists or
on the industry itself to have a public
health conscience.
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